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With the advent of new media technologies and approaches in the twentieth century, public
health officials became convinced that health needed mass media support. The World Health
Organization believed that educating people, as well as informing them about the health
situation around the world, could assist in the enduring fight against disease. Yet in an increas-
ingly competitive media landscape, the agency recognized the need to persuade people and
hold their attention through attractive presentation. Public information, the name given to the
multiple strategies used to communicate with the public, was rarely straightforward and
required the agency not only to monitor the impact of its own efforts but also to identify
opportunities to further enhance its reputation, especially when this was in danger of damage
or misappropriation. The WHO’s understanding of public information provides insights into the
development of international information, communication, and education networks and prac-
tices after 1945, as well as the increasingly central position of these processes in generating
support for and evincing the value of international organizations.
Keywords communications, mass media, photography, public information, world health
In the summer of 1956 the World Health Organization (WHO) considered an intriguing
proposal from George Englund, a producer and partner in a small Hollywood film company
called Pennebaker Productions. Englund sought to produce a feature film for a popular
audience based on the technical assistance activities of the United Nations (UN) and its
specialized agencies. His interest in international technical assistance had been stimulated some
two years previously, when he witnessed the work of the WHO and the UN in South Asia.
Afterwards he met with WHO officials to make his case, and by 1956 his team was eager to
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take the project to the next stage. On the face of it this was not an unusual request for support.
By that time the WHO had worked with numerous film and television companies,
photographers, and radio producers to document the organization’s activities. But what
marked this proposal out was the other name in the picture. Pennebaker was a small studio
which traded on the reputation of its only star and part-owner, Marlon Brando, the leading
man of box office successes such as The Wild One (1953) and On The Waterfront (1954).
Brando, too, was absorbed by the work of the UN, and saw it as the perfect theme for a high
drama extravaganza, with South Asia providing the exotic backdrop.1
Officials throughout the different sections of the WHO and the UN were both enticed by
and apprehensive about the idea. It was felt that Pennebaker’s pitch was persuasive enough:
Brando, Englund, and their writer, Stewart Stern, had all impressed as individuals who were
intelligently and earnestly interested in developing the film. Prior to Brando’s scheduled film
work in Japan, the group had reconnoitred a number of countries where technical assistance
programmes were underway. Furthermore, it was noted that there was little preventing
Pennebaker or indeed anyone else from making a film inspired by the UN. However, official
backing was a different matter. From here the project began to falter, largely because of the
fundamental need to protect the identity and integrity of UN agencies. While a high-profile film
might have served the WHO well in making its mission and work known on a grander scale
and to new audiences, it also had the potential to harm the agency’s reputation. The Penne-
baker group was advised that ‘undue and highly-coloured’ publicity of theWHO’s activities in
a country would be undesirable, and that they should be sensitive to the cautious attitude
which UN officers had to present in the field. The WHO’s director general, Dr Marcolino
Candau, warned that ‘any misconceptions which might be fostered by such a film would be
harmful, whether a particular agency was mentioned or not’.2 Ultimately the project went no
further within the UN, and in July 1959 Brando was still searching for the right script.3
Pennebaker eventually released a version of the film in 1963 as The Ugly American, based on
the bestselling 1958 novel by Eugene Burdick and William Lederer. In this version, Brando
played Harrison MacWhite, the United States ambassador to Sarkan, a fictional Southeast
Asian nation on the brink of civil war.4
The coming together of the WHO and Marlon Brando, albeit a minor footnote in the
history of the silver screen, has wider significance with regard to the attempts made by inter-
national organizations to communicate their existence and represent their work to different
audiences around the world. ‘Public information’ was the term given to the different materials
and strategies, including popular films, that were used by such organizations to raise awareness
and foster understanding of their role, as well as to mould public sentiment. This could not be
achieved simply by producing and disseminating information; publicity officers were often
required to creatively frame ‘information’ in exciting, touching, and memorable ways. This
article examines the public information machine, exploring what the WHO understood by
1 WHO Archives, Geneva, General Aspects of Film Production, Policy, Distribution, V6/158/1, Brando Film
Group Correspondence.
2 WHO Archives, General Aspects of Film Production, Policy, Distribution, V 6/158/1, 8 March 1956, Brando
Film Group Letter.
3 ‘Marlon Brando wants to make film on UN’, Sarasota Journal, 22 July 1959.
4 Bosley Crowther, ‘“The ugly American” opens: Marlon Brando stars as the U.S. diplomat’, New York
Times, 12 April 1963, http://www.nytimes.com/movie/review?res=9403E7DD103CE63ABC4A52DFB2668
388679EDE (consulted 20 October 2017).
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public information and what it intended it to do; how campaigns were structured andmanaged
in light of contemporary tensions about the use of propaganda; and how these strategies were
evaluated. It will discuss how the agency managed its image, as well as how it safeguarded its
brand and reputation. The WHO example is illustrative of the complex process of repre-
sentation in which international organizations were engaged. These campaigns required judi-
cious use of information and persuasion to target audiences who did not consume material
uncritically and were increasingly suspicious of the motives behind official communications.
The article finds that the WHO’s public information work had different but related pur-
poses. The first was to assist in developing an informed public opinion among all peoples on
matters of health, on the basis that the public could not be expected to give support without
accurate information regarding the problems that the WHO tackled. The second function was
to rouse and satisfy a general interest in the WHO and its work, which went beyond dis-
seminating information to showing the agency in a positive light. These two goals overlapped
and merged, and together display a different facet to international health in this period,
revealing attitudes that wavered between providing health education and prioritizing public
relations.
The SecondWorldWar compelled governments to organize mass media campaigns to keep
citizens informed about and loyal to the war effort. However, the rise of false andmanipulative
propaganda tarnished what had once been a neutral term and tainted the image of public
information. As such, while it became a significant component in the UN’s post-war drive for
international peace and cooperation, the specifics of operation and intentions in public
information campaigns were obscured. Mark Alleyne’s detailed history of the UN’s public
information work throughout the second half of the twentieth century notes a constant
tension: although the role of public information was to counter the threat of misinformation
and destructive propaganda, the organization was equally concerned that its own efforts
would be construed as propaganda, thereby damaging its international reputation.5
At the same time, many of the campaigns released by the UN’s specialized agencies were
designed to persuade and influence rather than soberly inform, epitomized by the growing
centrality of visual appeals. Tom Allbeson and Zoë Druick demonstrate how the United
Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) embraced visual media
strategies as a way to overcome national boundaries, inculcate mutual understanding, and
garner support for the agency’s work.6UNESCO sought to facilitate a ‘right’way of looking at
the world and its problems, and inspire a sense of obligation through, for instance, photo-
graphs of children.7 The extensive photograph campaigns of the United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF) similarly focussed on recognizable and emotional tropes, such as alternately
harrowing and uplifting photographs of mothers with children, to construct a visual vocabu-
lary of ‘hunger’ and ‘need’ which was used to generate support and donations for its mission.8
5 Mark Alleyne, Global lies? Propaganda, the UN, and world order, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2003, p. 23.
6 Tom Allbeson, ‘Photographic diplomacy in the postwar world: UNESCO and the conception of photography
as a universal language, 1946–56’, Modern Intellectual History, 12, 2, 2015, pp. 389–415; Zoë Druick,
‘UNESCO, film, and education: mediating postwar paradigms of communications’, in Charles Acland and
Haidee Wasson, eds., Useful cinema, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011.
7 Allbeson, ‘Photographic diplomacy’, p. 389.
8 Laura Briggs, ‘Mother, child, race, nation: the visual iconography of rescue and the politics of transnational
and transracial adoption’, Gender and History, 15, 2, 2003, pp. 191–3.
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UNICEF convened large-scale public relations campaigns in the United States, including ‘trick
or treat for UNICEF’, and used celebrities such as Danny Kaye and Peter Ustinov as goodwill
ambassadors.9 Although it is difficult to judge the precise nature of the impact, these high-
profile campaigns probably played a significant role in influencing how people around the
world perceived certain issues, countries, and peoples in ways that went beyond an awareness
of their plight and needs.
Official histories of the WHO confirm not only the importance of public information but
also the rich diversity of materials and strategies used to shape popular attitudes towards illness
and disease, which included cartoons, radio series, exhibitions, and world health observation
days.10 As the most popular leisure pursuit in the immediate post-war years, film was excep-
tionally important, and Kirsten Ostherr has examined a number of WHO films to determine
how they influenced popular understandings about the global spread of disease.11 The era also
witnessed the unprecedented popularity of weekly photo magazines: Bert Hansen argues that,
before the mass availability of television, Life magazine was instrumental in creating visual
archetypes of nurses and medical researchers, which became so familiar to the public eye that
they took on the status of icons.12 The WHO published its own illustrated magazines that
mirrored the style of Life, and the agency’s published and unpublished photography includes a
truly vast range of stories, countries, and photographers, including archival files for more than
800 photo missions conducted between 1953 and 1989.
Thomas David and Davide Rodogno have led the way in opening up the extensive
WHO photographic legacy to scrutiny. They have revealed information about the nature of
collaborations with outside agents such as the celebrated Magnum photo agency,
and have identified particular narratives in the agency’s work up to the late 1960s.13 They
argue that the WHO relied on photographs to construct ‘before and after’ narratives which
precisely demonstrated the efficacy of medical interventions and, by extension, the
important work of the WHO. Photo stories also drew upon recognizable and understandable
themes about development and progression, centred on a cast of villains, victims and
saviours.14 These narratives enabled the WHO to give its technical assistance work a human
face, allowing it to portray incontrovertible proof of its success and thereby enhancing
its authority.
While films and photographic campaigns were central pillars of the WHO’s communica-
tions, they were part of a larger public information machine set up to inform the ‘greatest
number of people within the general public about the Organization’s work and about health
9 Randall Packard, A history of global health: interventions into the lives of other peoples, Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016, pp. 125–7.
10 WHO, The first ten years of the World Health Organization, Geneva: WHO, 1958; WHO, The second ten
years of the World Health Organization, Geneva: WHO, 1968; Socrates Litsios, The third ten years of the
World Health Organization, Geneva: WHO, 2008; WHO, The fourth ten years of the World Health Orga-
nization, Geneva: WHO, 2011.
11 Kirsten Ostherr, ‘Contagion and the boundaries of the visible: the cinema of world health’, Camera Obscura,
17, 2, 2002, pp. 1–38; Kirsten Ostherr, Cinematic prophylaxis: globalization and contagion in the discourse
of world health, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005.
12 Bert Hansen, Picturing medical progress from Pasteur to polio: a history of mass media, New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 2009, p. 208.
13 Thomas David and Davide Rodogno, ‘All the world loves a picture: the World Health Organization’s visual
politics, 1948–73’, in Heide Fehrenbach and Davide Rodogno, eds., Humanitarian photography: a history,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 223–48.
14 Ibid., pp. 231–42.
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matters more generally’.15 This article builds on the work of David and Rodogno in a number
of key areas. It reconstructs the agency’s attitude to and development of public information
campaigns across roughly the first two decades of the WHO’s operation until the 1970s, and
shows how this impacted on the design and distribution of theWHO’s magazines. It locates the
agency’s photographic output within this public information context to add information
regarding how certain visual narratives were built up and propounded. A key strategy in
relation to photographs was to distribute them as widely as possible, and the article therefore
examines the mechanisms used to do this, the consequent reach of the images, and their
afterlife beyond theWHO. Unpublished notes and contact sheets from photographic missions,
in conjunction with published variants, demonstrate that, despite its appreciated capacity to
provide an accurate pictorial record, photography was used primarily emotionally, in order to
sensitize the public to issues that the WHO thought important. Photography therefore repre-
sents a key way to a better understanding of how the WHO approached its public information
work. However, this was not without its problems: the discussion surrounding the Brando film
project is just one high-profile instance that demonstrates the WHO’s early interest in projects
which embraced popular visual culture as a means to propagate messages about science,
health, and development, but that the organization was also anxious to control the nature of
such messages.
The rise of public information
The beginning of international cooperation in the field of health is commonly traced to the
organization of the Sanitary Conferences, the first of which was held in 1851. However, by the
late nineteenth century the tide of opinion held that a permanent regulatory body would be
better placed to oversee matters in the long term. An International Sanitary Bureau was sub-
sequently formed in 1902, followed by the Office International d’Hygiene Publique in 1907.16
After the First World War, the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) was given a
broad remit to prevent and control the spread of disease, and to examine health problems
relating to nutrition, housing, and rural hygiene. The LNHO operated with mixed success
throughout the interwar years, and its work was all but halted during the Second World War.
In April 1945, the Allied nations assembled at the United Nations Conference on International
Organization to debate the maintenance of peace and security through international coop-
eration on economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems. However, these discussions
did not at first envisage an agency specializing in health. This omission prompted the Brazilian
and Chinese delegations to propose the amalgamation of existing health organizations into one
specialized agency, recognizing that health was a fundamental pillar of international peace and
security and should be formally acknowledged as such.17 With the UN ultimately agreeing
upon the value of such an agency, the International Health Conference was convened in New
York between June and July 1946 to draft the constitution of theWHO and arrange an interim
15 WHO, The work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations, 1950, Geneva: WHO, 1951, p. 71, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85609 (consulted
20 October 2017).
16 Iris Borowy, Coming to terms with world health: the League of Nations Health Organization, 1921–1946,
Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009, pp. 12–13, 26–9; John Farley, Brock Chisholm, the World Health Organization,
and the Cold War, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008, p. 10.
17 Farley, Brock Chisholm, p. 10.
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commission to preside over health matters until the agency was established. The constitution
came into force on 7 April 1948. That date would henceforth be known as ‘World Health
Day’, to commemorate the agency’s formation and to direct international attention towards
urgent health problems. As well as a central headquarters at the Palais de Nations in Geneva,
regional offices were established in Africa, the Americas, Southeast Asia, Europe, the Eastern
Mediterranean, and the Western Pacific.18
The WHO’s role was to provide technical assistance to UN member states, meaning that it
would not intervene directly but work with governments to develop efficient health services,
monitor outbreaks of disease, promote health education, and coordinate research. Its constitution
proclaimed good health to be the right of every human regardless of race, religion, political belief,
or economic or social condition, and defined health ambitiously as a state of complete physical,
mental, and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. However, from
the very start opinion was divided over how this could and should be achieved. The WHO’s first
director general, BrockChisholm, together with key figures in theWHO’s formation such as René
Sand, Andrija Stampar, and Karl Evang, was a proponent of social medicine, which advocated a
slower, holistic approach to health, linked to broader development.19Yet the SecondWorldWar
had delivered new ‘weapons’ in the fight against disease, in the form of antibiotics, vaccines, and
insecticides, which promised quick resolutions.
This tension between targeted, rapid interventions and the more measured and extensive
social medicine approach was heightened by Cold War suspicions: while the Soviet Union
favoured social medicine, it was distrusted by the United States, which insisted that vertical
programmes and rapid-action projects provided the best chance of success. The United States
also believed that the impressive new medical weapons could be used to counter the spread of
Communism by winning the hearts and minds of countries facing ingrained health problems.20
When the Soviet Union and the communist nations in its sphere of influence boycotted the UN
system in 1949 (returning in 1956), the United States became freer to influence the WHO’s
work priorities.21 Disease eradication campaigns against malaria, tuberculosis, and venereal
diseases became prominent and well-covered initiatives in WHO’s arsenal.
Although such programmes were prominent, it was felt that the success of theWHO should
not depend solely on them, and the agency’s constitution called for the development of
informed opinion on matters of health.22 The envisioned audience was not just medical and
public health professionals but all humankind. Brock Chisholm spoke of his desire to instil a
‘world health consciousness’.23 Becoming operational in September 1948, the WHO Public
InformationOffice (PIO) was tasked with helping to achieve this by presenting and interpreting
the activities of the agency for the public. Its role was to ensure the readability and uniformity
of style of publications; disseminate the findings of technical divisions; satisfy requests for
information from publicity media and international, governmental, professional, and civic
18 For more on the history and operation of regional offices, see Kelley Lee, The World Health Organization,
London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 30–4.
19 Farley, Brock Chisholm, p. 111.
20 Ibid., pp. 116–17.
21 Theodore Brown, Marcos Cueto, and Elizabeth Fee, ‘TheWorld Health Organization and the transition from
“international” to “global” public health’, American Journal of Public Health, 96, 1, 2006, p. 65.
22 WHO constitution, Art. 2(r).
23 WHO, Work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations, 1951, Geneva:WHO, 1952, p. 1, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85637 (consulted 20
October 2017).
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organizations; and help combat sensationalist reporting and misinformation on health
matters.24
By this time, public information was of acknowledged importance, explaining why a
dedicated office was formed so early in WHO’s history. In the early years of the twentieth
century, new psychological theories about how to influence public attitudes had raised the
profile of public information. The burgeoning mass media environment afforded greater
opportunity to influence public opinion, but it also meant that organizations competed for
attention and support in an increasingly crowded marketplace. Francesca Piana shows that,
facing competition in the humanitarian realm, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) established a Propaganda Commission in 1919 to advertise its activities through
photographs and film. Such campaigns provided evidence of the ICRC’s work, yet sought to
draw audiences to its cause by displaying unequivocally the plight of suffering and rescued
peoples.25During the interwar years, the Save the Children fund spent 5%of its annual income
on advertising in national broadsheets and radio broadcasts, and published a bi-monthly
magazine titled The world’s children.26 High-ranking figures in the League of Nations stressed
that ‘the public all over the world will have to be taught to think internationally, to look at
public affairs, not merely from the sectional national point of view, but also from a broad
human international point of view’.27 Heidi Tworek shows that, for the League, public
information strategies represented a key tool to counteract the spread of false information,
encourage international cooperation, and assist with the ‘moral disarmament’ of all nations.
However, the WHO PIO was inaugurated at a time of heightened suspicion surrounding
public information. As Mark Wollaneger points out, before the Second World War ‘propa-
ganda’ was often used in a neutral sense in relation to advertising, but during the conflict it
became linked to more sinister motives of deception and coercion.28 Yet, although terms such
as ‘information’, ‘propaganda’, and ‘publicity’ continued to be used interchangeably behind
closed doors, the war alerted the public to the potential dishonesty of information.29 Alleyne’s
work demonstrates that, while the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) was formed in
1946 to inform and educate citizens about global problems and priorities, and to sensitize them
to the benefits of mutual understanding and collaboration, it was equally concerned about
accusations of ‘propaganda’.30 Explaining the department’s functions in the Public Opinion
Quarterly, Benjamin Cohen, the first assistant secretary general in charge of the DPI, noted that
it would ‘collect, collate and give out factual information concerning the United Nations on an
international basis’, but stated categorically that it was ‘not a propaganda agency’.31
24 WHO Interim Commission, WHO.IC/106, ‘World Health Organization public information’, 1947.
25 Francesca Piana, ‘Photography, cinema, and the quest for influence: the International Committee of the Red
Cross in the wake of the First World War’, in Heide Fehrenbach and Davide Rodogno, eds., Humanitarian
photography: a history, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 144–56.
26 Emily Baughan, ‘“Every citizen of Empire implored to save the Children!” Empire, internationalism and the
Save the Children Fund in inter-war Britain’, Historical Research, 86, 231, 2013, pp. 123–4.
27 Heidi Tworek, ‘Peace through truth? The press and moral disarmament through the League of Nations’,
Medien & Zeit, 25, 4, 2010, pp. 16–23.
28 Mark Wollaeger, Modernism, media, and propaganda: British narrative from 1900 to 1945, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2007, pp. 3–13.
29 Ibid., p. 7.
30 Alleyne, Global lies?, pp. 4–5.
31 Benjamin Cohen, ‘The U.N.’s department of public information’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 10, 2, 1946,
p. 146.
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In line with the common information policy envisaged by the UN and its specialized
agencies,32 the WHO similarly demanded that all its information should be ‘presented in an
objective way, avoiding any intention of propaganda’.33 Yet internally the lines were blurred,
since the need to persuade as well as inform was frequently acknowledged. The terminology
used to explain the concept was varied: a 1947 report by the WHO’s Interim Commission
described public information activities as ‘simply another media of public relations’;34 a 1955
public information study stated that, while public information should be used to ‘promote
knowledge and understanding of the reasons for the Organization’s existence, aims and its
activities’, it needed to combine ‘strict scientific accuracy’ with ‘attractive and popular pre-
sentation of material’.35 In the official document recording the WHO’s first ten years of
operation, the basic function of public information was described as being to make ‘the facts
easily available in an appropriate and acceptable form’ because the agency’s policies and
programmes ‘will be appreciated only if the scientific facts underlying them are made widely
known’.36 Yet readership should also be ‘influenced’ by coverage that combined technical
accuracy with a presentation sufficiently attractive to engage and hold the interest of the
general public.37
Early strategies addressed the dilemma of priming the public to be interested in the WHO’s
work and amenable to its goals while remaining objective and impartial. ‘Basic’ public infor-
mation materials included those which were ‘written, oral or visual, explaining the history,
purpose, philosophy, structure and methods of work of the Organization, and describing
various health activities which are its concern’.38 For internal purposes, this documentation
was divided into ‘general documentation’ and ‘specialized reporting’, although it was
acknowledged that no hard and fast distinction was possible.39 The folder titled ‘WHO, what
it is, what it does, how it works’ provided essential facts about the WHO’s operation, while
booklets such as ‘Strategy for world health’ and the more romantically titled ‘The lamp is lit’
presented the story of the agency and its practical work in a popular form. An illustration of the
type of undertaking that resulted from these steps was the externally published 1956 book for
young people, Mankind against the killers, authored by James Hemming. The outcome of
discussions held in 1953,40 it contained a foreword by Brock Chisholm and, although it dealt
with international health work in general, many sections eulogized the WHO’s existence.
Chapter 14, ‘The front line’ began:
On a magnificent site near one end of the Lake of Geneva, and favoured with a glorious
view of lofty Mont Blanc on the far side of the lake, stands a gracious and commanding
building. It is the property of no nation, no government, no wealthy business syndicate;
it belongs instead to everyone – to mankind. … All day long the Palais hums with
32 Alleyne, Global lies?, p. 4.
33 WHO, ‘Study of problems of public information’, 1955, p. 3, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/104073
(consulted 20 October 2017).
34 WHO Interim Commission, WHO.IC/106, ‘World Health Organization public information’, 1947.
35 WHO, ‘Study of problems of public information’, p. 3.
36 WHO, First ten years, p. 445.
37 Ibid., pp. 454 and 447.
38 WHO, ‘Study of problems of public information’, p. 2.
39 Ibid., p. 3.
40 WHO, The work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations, 1955, Geneva: WHO, 1956, p. 52, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85666 (consulted
20 October 2017).
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activity. Its staff, recruited from forty different nations, have a constant full schedule of
work. Visitors of all nations and colours come and go; they bring the health problems of
their own countries and take away the best advice the world has to offer …41
While enhancing the WHO’s public image would not be discussed seriously until the 1970s,
the issue was present right from its inception, evinced in the orchestration of public-oriented
publications as well as the design and management of an emblem (comprising the symbol of the
United Nations surmounted by an Aesculapian staff and serpent in gold), and in the measures
taken to safeguard against unauthorized usage of the WHO’s professional identity. Although
allusions to propaganda were publicly played down, these efforts served an important public
relations role and helped to establish the WHO as an acknowledged authority on health matters.
In the years before the professionalization of dedicated health correspondents, medical
advances or disease outbreaks could be reported erroneously in the popular press.42 While this
was impossible for theWHO to control, the agency sought to balance the flow of information by
relaying the organizational viewpoint and making the facts ‘easily available and in an appro-
priate and acceptable form’.43 For health measures to have lasting value, people of all ages
needed to be persuaded to take an intelligent and responsible part in solving their personal health
problems and those of the community.44 The PIO’s activities therefore aimed to downplay
scaremongering and miraculous promises, and to nurture public interest in health matters.
Officials recognized that this could not be achieved through the limited reach of WHO pub-
lications alone, and the stimulation of outside coverage was considered a specialist taskwhich, in
view of budgetary restraints, was the only hope of featuring the WHO in the ‘expensive’media.
Yet professional reporters could not be ordered to cover theWHO, and the results of their work
could not be guaranteed. Selected writers, journalists, and producers were therefore invited to
visit the WHO’s Geneva headquarters, and travel fellowships were arranged but financed
externally.45 Sensitive to the charge of propaganda, the WHO imposed the condition that the
resultingmaterials should be the work of these independent ‘witnesses’. In 1967more than 2,000
people visited the WHO’s headquarters in the orderly and impressive Palais des Nations.46
To further facilitate this process, the WHO published its own public-oriented magazines,
first the Newsletter and later World Health. The Newsletter was inaugurated in September
1948 as a small, typewritten publication of six pages without illustrations. It rapidly under-
went stylistic changes and a revamped Newsletter was introduced in March 1949, ‘primarily
for individuals and institutions, whether public or private, with an interest in the work of the
WHO or in international co-operation on health matters generally’.47 It was nevertheless
welcomed by field staff, who felt isolated from the organization’s wider activities.
41 James Hemming, Mankind against the killers, London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1956, p. 199.
42 See, for instance, Anne Karpf,Doctoring the media: the reporting of health andmedicine, London: Routledge,
1988.
43 WHO, First ten years, p. 447.
44 WHO, Work of WHO: annual report 1951, p. 2.
45 WHO, ‘Study on problems of public information’, pp. 13–16.
46 WHO, The work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations, 1967, Geneva: WHO, 1968, p. 48, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85804 (consulted
20 October 2017).
47 WHO Newsletter, no. 10, September 1949. Other publications such as the WHO Chronicle were acknow-
ledged as the ‘most suitable medium for presenting to professional health workers reliable information on the
work of the Organization’. Governing bodies WHA3.A3/81, ‘Reconsideration of the WHO programme of
publications’, May 1950.
102 j A L E X A N D E R M E D C A L F
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1740022817000304
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of York, on 20 Feb 2018 at 14:57:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
The Newsletter was distributed gratis from the WHO headquarters and regional offices in
response to individual requests, and by 1955 60,000 copies were circulated.48 Its successor,
World Health, represented a further step away from simply satisfying the demand for infor-
mation and towards inciting and shaping interest. Its official purpose was to ‘stimulate and
nourish interest in international health matters among the general public’,49 and therefore the
criteria governing the selection of material were popular appeal and general attractiveness,
where the human interest angle was usually ‘played up’.50
By 1959,World Health had circulated some 80,000 copies in English, Spanish, French, and
Portuguese; a decade later this had increased to around 120,000.51 Arrangements were also
made for issues to be translated into Russian, and the German Green Cross published a
German edition. Appreciating that there was a realistic limit to the reach of its magazines, the
WHO hoped that the content within would catch the eye of mainstream media editors and
journalists. To expedite this process, articles and photographs printed in both magazines were
made freely available for reproduction: ‘Are you an editor? If so has it ever struck you that
some of the stories you read in this Newsletter would also interest the readers of your news-
paper or periodical? You are at liberty to reprint anything appearing in these pages free of
charge and without writing to the WHO for permission.’52 Should editors want to use the
stories as a starting point for more in-depth features, the PIO also advertised the availability of
additional text and illustrations upon request.
The key feature of such publications was their focus on photographs. In 1952, 200
photographs were distributed per month in response to external requests, and escalating
demand necessitated that the WHO acquire its own photographic laboratory the following
year. By 1957, 40,000 photographic prints were prepared for distribution, and in 1966 this
number exceeded 50,000.53 Although photographic production was centralized in Geneva,
distribution and the acquisition of new material relied on the assistance of information officers
throughout the regionalized structure. The Third Annual Report to the Regional Committee
for South East Asia recorded photography’s prominence among public information activities,
describing interest from newspapers, radio stations, health officials, and UN and welfare
organizations.54 In 1956 photographic distribution was facilitated by supplying all regional
information officers with a stock of reproductions from the Newsletter.55
48 WHO, ‘Study on problems of public information’, p. 4.
49 WHO, ‘Organizational study on publications’, WHO Executive Board Provisional agenda item 2.4(а) ЕЗ25/32,
16 December 1959, p. 40, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/135456 (consulted 20 October 2017).
50 WHO, ‘Organizational study of publications’, Executive Board E 2/445/3, 7 May 1958.
51 WHO, ‘Organizational study on publications’, December 1959, p. 52; WHO, The Second Ten Years of the
World Health Organization, p. 292.
52 WHO Newsletter, November–December 1951.
53 WHO, Minutes of the fourteenth meeting, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 20 January 1953, Governing bodies
EB11, EB 11/Min/14 Rev. 1; Annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations, 1957, Geneva: WHO, 1958, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/88756 (consulted
13 November 2017); Annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations, 1965, Geneva: WHO, 1966, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/89361 (consulted
13 November 2017).
54 WHO, SEA/RC4/2, Third annual report of the Regional Director to the Regional Committee for South East
Asia, New Delhi, 30 August 1951.
55 WHO, The work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations, 1956, Geneva: WHO, 1957, p. 47, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85682 (consulted
20 October 2017).
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The Newsletter and World Health were visually lavish, and many issues included stories
told primarily through photographs. The semi-regular ‘WHO in action’ series
illustrated health topics with a selection of photographs, collated from around the world. In
other examples, ‘SEEN by photographers of World Health around the globe’ depicted
malaria eradication with views selected from over 1,000 photographs,56 while ‘Leprosy
demystified’ distilled key images from some 25,000 photographs taken by Pierre-Andre
Pittet.57 Although offered as visual evidence of the WHO in action, such stories
frequently relied on broader narratives about the suffering of those affected by disease
and how they were helped. To appreciate how these stories fitted in with the broader
demands of public information, it is necessary to go beyond and behind the published
photographs to explore the organizational culture responsible for their compilation and
selection.
As seen through the eyes of the WHO
By the mid twentieth century, citizens around the world were inundated with visual messages
about health and humanitarianism. Humanitarian organizations had increasingly circulated
imagery in pamphlets, newsletters, and publications since the beginning of the twentieth
century, with the volume intensifying in the interwar years.58 Visual messages about health
appeared in governmentally produced education pamphlets, exhibitions, and films. Health was
also covered by illustrated magazines, where photographs were frequently the story. Life
magazine’s photographers helped to visualize the unfamiliar, introducing readers to new
medical procedures as well as conditions in far corners of the globe. In conjunction with
photography’s ability to display people, events, and artefacts with apparent realism,
there was now a trend towards a more emotional, documentary photography. The Magnum
collective, founded by a group of European photographers who were ambivalent to traditional
power structures, emphasized ordinary people and everyday experiences through their work.59
The 1948 photo essay ‘People are people the world over’, by Robert Capa, published across
twelve issues of the Ladies’ Home Journal, sought to document the commonalities
in human existence.60 It laid the groundwork for subsequent photo essays and exhibitions such
as the 1955 Family of Man exhibition curated by Edward Steichen.61 Family ofManwas based
on the idea that photography had a unique ability to explain people to one another, demon-
strated through a pictorial focus on significant moments of human existence such as birth, love,
work, and death. Subsequently touring the world and proving extremely popular, the exhibi-
tion provided an optimistic view of life and a message of hope and brotherhood.
As Jean-Claude Gautrand argues, it represented the triumph of humanist photography
56 World Health, December 1961.
57 World Health, July–August 1960.
58 Heide Fehrenbach and Davide Rodogno, ‘“A horrific photo of a drowned Syrian child”: humanitarian
photography and NGOmedia strategies in historical perspective’, International Review of the Red Cross, 97,
900, 2015, p. 1123; Piana, ‘Photography’, p. 146; Baughan, ‘Every citizen’, pp. 123–4.
59 Frank Goodyear, ‘The face redrawn: Magnum portraits’, in Steven Hoelscher, ed., Reading Magnum: a visual
archive of the modern world, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2013, p. 93.
60 John G. Morris, Get the picture: a personal history of photojournalism, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press 2002, pp. 113–21.
61 Monique Berlier, ‘The family of man: reading of an exhibition’, in Bonnie Brennen and Hanno Hardt, eds.,
Picturing the past: media, history, and photography, Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1999, p. 209.
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characterized by sensitivity to the ‘simple joys of life, an empathy for people in the street,
caught in action’.62
The UN and its specialized agencies shared the view that photographs could help to foster
attention and understanding across geographical, cultural, and linguistic barriers. Public
information officials were able to discuss planning and policy, and to share common problems
at bodies such as the Consultative Committee for Public Information and the United Nations
Film Board.63 However, each agency honed its own systems and styles in response to indivi-
dual requirements. One of UNESCO’s earliest missions was a photographic report on the
needs of children in Poland, Greece, Italy, Hungary, and Austria, but, like the WHO, it also
published a public-oriented magazine, the UNESCO Courier, which included arresting
photography.64 A major function of UNICEF’s information policy was fundraising, and the
agency relied on photographs as evidence of its work by instructing commercial photographers
to capture the absence of disease and hunger, as well as poignant photographs of mothers and
children that were frequently repeated to garner public support for its initiatives.65
The WHO’s photographs were initially contributed by the agency’s own field project
workers, but were ultimately deemed to lack professional quality because they were generally
taken by people ‘unfamiliar with the media of information’.66 In May 1950 a visual media
expert was assigned to arrange photographic missions treating the WHO’s worldwide
activities, with the first professional mission completed in 1951.67 The WHO embedded
photographers within the agency: the Frenchman Didier Henrioud and the Hungarian Tibor
Farkas coordinated efforts at WHO headquarters as well as contributing their own reports,
while Ajaib Kochar (born in what had become Pakistan) worked as an information officer at
the Regional Office for South East Asia. However, the agency relied predominantly on well-
regarded photographic agencies such as Magnum, and eminent individuals including the
American Homer Page, the French photographers Marc Riboud, Jean Philippe Charbonnier,
and Eric Schwab, and the Swiss photographer JeanMohr. The contributions of internationally
known professionals addressed the difficulty of obtaining vivid first-hand accounts of field
activities from technical staff, and lent theNewsletter andWorld Health cachet and authority.
Because of their practical experience, these photographers were also able to operate in difficult
conditions and deal with taxing travel commitments.
Photographic narratives were built up in response to the input of many individuals. Once
each mission was authorized, photographers were supplied with background information on
the countries and the topics in question, and met with regional WHO officials as well as
specialists and heads of facilities. Guidelines about places to visit and what to photograph were
flexible, since it was acknowledged that missions would have to adapt to unforeseen and
unavoidable circumstances. Some photographers were able to follow the human drama as it
unfolded. Erling Mandelmann’s detailed mission report on Sweden’s drug problem described
62 Jean-Claude Gautrand, ‘Looking at others: humanism and neo-realism’, in Michel Frizot, A new history of
photography, Cologne: Könemann, 1998, pp. 613–27.
63 WHO, First ten years, p. 453.
64 This was conducted by the photographer David Seymour, European photo-correspondent for the New York
magazine This Week. ‘UNESCO begins photo survey of war-hit nations’,UNESCO Courier, 1, 4, 1948, p. 3.
65 Briggs, ‘Mother, child, race, nation’, pp. 192–6.
66 WHO, The work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations, 1953, Geneva: WHO, 1954, p. 59, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85650 (consulted
20 October 2017).
67 WHO, Work of WHO: annual report 1950, p. 71.
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what he himself saw, including ‘a young man take [sic] his injection openly on a bank – even
[though] addicts are chased strongly by the police’, and ‘objects that the police has [sic] found
under raids… from Opium and Cannabis-Cakes to Amphetamine’.68 Mandelmann traced the
addicts around the city as they evaded the police.
In other cases, however, very specific instructions were supplied. For a mission on public
health in the English city of Liverpool, a list of preferred shots and topics was provided to the
photographer Spooner (no first name given), who was asked to capture the ‘little-known,
silent, invariably unseen and un-lauded’ health services of the city, and show themedical officer
of health as an ‘unseen, unheard of “guardian angel” of health’. Under the heading ‘Human
Contact’, the script requested a ‘possibly symbolic shot showing personal contact between
Professor Semple, MOH [Medical Officer of Health], and people he is forced to prosecute – on
steps of law courts (imposing building of grimy black Portland) after prosecution, if such a case
comes up’.69 In another case, Josef Breitenback’s mission report on cancer in Japan suggests
that he too was given specific requirements because he wrote that he had been unable to
photograph former patients at home: ‘Such a thing takes weeks of preparation and talks, more
so in Japan than elsewhere to obtain permission.’ Breitenback instead offered amateur pho-
tographs of a doctor posed with patients.70 Comprising dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of
individual shots, each mission returned a range of views that helped to set the scene, as well as
showing actors and equipment.
But, as Amy Lyford and Carol Payne caution, the practice of photojournalism should not
be glorified at the expense of the deliberation and complexity of the wider picturing process.71
All the film shot on location was assembled into contact sheets and returned to the WHO.72
The contact sheets enabled PIO officials to inspect and compare the work; using crosses, lines,
and circles in thick pencil they identified features which were unsuitable, areas to be cropped,
and the shots approved for publication. For the historian this intervention provides insights
into how visual narratives were built up and how the stipulations of public information were
transferred via the camera and onto the page. Figures 1 and 2, from Peter Larson’s 1968 photo
mission on malaria in Mexico (which comprised twenty-five contact sheets in total), include
photographs of patients, doctors, spray teams, equipment, scenes of village life, dwellings, and
the local landscape. Figure 1 shows the malaria sprayman captured in various arrangements,
including interacting with villagers and as seen from their perspective. The latter (marked
‘13011’ on this sheet), ultimately selected for publication, portrayed the sprayman as a war-
rior, posed in a style emulating a knight of old and thus implicitly endorsing the WHO’s
characterization of the malaria programme as a war on an ancient foe. Larson’s photograph
fitted into a trope established since Eric Schwab’s 1958 photo mission to Mexico, when the
suggested text argued that ‘this is WAR, but to save lives, not to sacrifice them, and it calls for
the thoroughness of military organization in planning and in logistics…High-ranking military
68 WHO Archives, Photographic Archives, Sub-fonds Photographers, 1970, Cardio and Drugs, Sweden,
Mandelmann.
69 WHO Archives, Photographic Archives, Sub-fonds Photographers, 1963 Public Health Liverpool, England,
1963, Spooner.
70 WHO Archives, Photographic Archives, Sub-fonds Photographers, 1969, Cancer, Japan, Breitenback, letter
to Mr Tibor Farkas, 1 November 1969.
71 Amy Lyford and Carol Payne, ‘Photojournalism, mass media and the politics of spectacle’, Visual Resources,
21, 2, 2005, p. 121.
72 Kristen Lubben, ed., Magnum contact sheets, London: Thames and Hudson, 2011, p. 9.
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officers direct the campaign from an operational headquarters, from which they deploy their
spray-teams as though they were combat troops. “SupremeHeadquarters” isWHO’s Regional
Office’.74 Figure 2 displays the similar diligence applied to create a haunting photograph of one
of the victims of this war. The contact sheet carries shots of the patient’s alert and piercing gaze,
but the crosses show how these were rejected in favour of a sleepier vision of despair and
emptiness. Her hand, extended limply out towards the viewer, was preferred to more detailed
shots of her examination. The text painted her as ‘the face of malaria’, the material impact of
an ‘ancient curse’ which brought ‘delirium, death and economic ruin’.75
There is little evidence of consistent attempts to enhance such views by altering them
mechanically before publication. AlthoughDavid and Rodogno cite an example in relation to a
story about premature babies, a comparison of contact sheets with published images suggests
Figure 1. Contact sheet from Peter Larson, Malaria, Mexico, 1968. Photographic Archives,
Sub-fonds Photographers, WHO Archives. Copyright WHO.73
73 Reprinted from WHO Archives, Photographic Archives, Sub-fonds Photographers, Peter Larson, Malaria,
Mexico, copyright WHO (1968).
74 WHO Archives, Photographic Archives, Sub-fonds Photographers, 1958, Background-Mexico-Malaria-
Schwab.
75 World Health, April 1968.
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that this was not an everyday practice, perhaps used when no other alternative was available or
in response to specific time pressures.77 Published photographs tended to appear faithful to the
originals, albeit cropped and organized in relation to text and other images. TheWHOwanted
the photographs to speak for themselves as an unembellished and authoritative record of
health ‘seen through the eyes of the WHO’. Yet, while little mechanical manipulation took
place, the view was shaped in diverse ways by the instructions given to photographers, by the
guides who accompanied them, by the people they photographed, and by the selection process
after the films had been returned to the WHO. Indeed, as seen above, the captions and
accompanying texts instructed the viewer in how to approach the images. The PIO was further
complicit in skewing the picture by featuring photographs which emphasized good practice, or
by including examples where programmes were fully operational. Ultimately, the process was
geared towards the creation of a carefully staged drama rather than snapshots from the front
lines of health.
Figure 2. Contact Sheet from Peter Larson, Malaria, Mexico, 1968. Photographic Archives,
Sub-fonds Photographers, WHO Archives. Copyright WHO.76
76 Reprinted from WHO Archives, Photographic Archives, Sub-fonds Photographers, Peter Larson, Malaria,
Mexico, copyright WHO (1968).
77 David and Rodogno, ‘All the world loves a picture’, pp. 228–30.
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Though international health was played out across the world by including human faces in
all manner of stories, often rather simple techniques were used to direct the reader’s attention
and generate both understanding and empathy. Miserable faces underscored the need to solve
problems; damaged ones stressed the urgency and magnitude of problems. The cover image
chosen for aNewsletter issue on alcoholism pictured a man lying incapacitated on the ground
(Figure 3). He looked tormented, with his mouth partially open and shadows playing across his
deeply furrowed brow. The image was tilted at an unusual angle, stressing the intoxicating
effect of alcohol, and life spiralling out of control.79 Such constructions were meant to make
viewers feel for the plight of the ‘victim’ and pay attention to the message. But notions of
villainy, victimhood, and deliverance were all combined in this image. In other stories the
damage wrought by leprosy, yaws, and smallpox was plain to see, but the WHO also did not
Figure 3. WHO Newsletter, July–August 1954, front cover. Copyright WHO.78
78 Reprinted from World Health, July–August 1954, Copyright WHO (1954).
79 WHO Newsletter, July–August 1954.
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shy away from presenting the realities of medical procedures in their ability to prevent and cure
this damage. The lead story in the first issue of World Health, January–February 1957
(Figure 4), carried a close-up photograph of a girl called Adama, her eyes closed, as a small
incision was made to collect a tissue sample to test for leprosy. At first glance, the most visible
and disturbing sight is the implement poised to break Adama’s skin, although this is intended
to assure the reader that timely action has saved her from further disfigurement, since further
down the page she is shown on her way to receive treatment.
In contrast, happy and hopeful faces were used to show problems being resolved, to inspire
further action, and to approve the work of the WHO. But this went beyond ‘before and after’
narratives that showed damaged faces and healed ones following treatment. The innocent faces
of children, or the arresting faces of young women, drawn from countries around the world
were used to capture the viewer’s interest, but this was not always done to inspire pity, concern,
Figure 4. World Health, January–February 1957, front cover. Copyright WHO.80
80 Reprinted from World Health, January–February 1957. Copyright WHO (1957).
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or relief. Optimism was also a strong feature: Maria Luisa ‘showed the way’ on the cover of a
1961 special issue on health in the Americas (Figure 5). In looking upwards and to a fixed point
in the distance, she appears to suggest that, although still some way off, the way forward
represented a bright and alluring prospect. Indeed, one might read her expression as anywhere
between dreamlike and fixated on this idea of hope. Although her name is given, and facial
features and expression are clearly visible, the blurring of the edges of Maria Luisa’s face omits
contextualizing information such as hairstyle, clothing, or location, giving the impression of an
every-person. This cover photograph testifies to the WHO’s preoccupation with human
interest, but also its desire to move beyond the medicalized gaze and on to universally felt
emotions of determination, hope, and happiness.
While the tale of victory has been identified as an important pillar of the WHO’s visual
politics,82 it was equally important to visualize the work undertaken to achieve this in photo
stories that described searching, hunting, and scouring. The images were intended to support
the notion that all possible efforts were being marshalled to combat and overcome the causes of
Figure 5. World Health, special issue: ‘The Americas’, September–October 1961. Copyright
WHO.81
81 Reprinted from World Health, September–October 1961. Copyright WHO (1961).
82 David and Rodogno, ‘All the world loves a picture’, pp. 231–5.
C O M M U N I C A T I N G W O R L D H E A L T H , 1 9 4 8 – 7 0 j1 1 1
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1740022817000304
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of York, on 20 Feb 2018 at 14:57:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
ill health. Such efforts could be initiated, for instance, by innovative technology and scientific
breakthroughs, with reportage taking place in the laboratory and the operating theatre, where
the actors searched for answers and pursued microscopic enemies. In the 1963 feature ‘The
unknown guardian angels have faces’ (Figure 6), the photographs showed public health offi-
cials examining hotels, as well as utensils and foodstuffs. Again, the viewer is invited to scru-
tinize their faces, and, while comparatively stoic, their expressions of concentration
underscored the diligence and expertise necessary to prevent people falling ill.83 World Health
January–February 1962 carried a story of a Hong Kong opium hunt, in which the photo-
graphs, by the Hungarian Paul Almasy, depicted policemen and specially trained dogs
searching the streets for drug peddlers. One even showed a pursuit in progress across the roofs
of the town as smokers escaped through a window.84 But the same point was made in relation
to the dedication to the betterment of humankind which was held to thrive in every person,
regardless of their location or background. The impression of a pursuit added drama and
constituted an important narrative stepping stone in relation to the WHO’s ‘before and after’
photographs, which showed problems and resolutions. But such photo stories also added
weight to the implication that people should maintain their vigilance in the face of threats to
public health.
Although human actors were privileged in the drama of international health, place and
location played an important role in structuring and staging the photographic performance. In
depicting remote rural areas, the magazines asked readers to consider the difficulties of staying
healthy in inaccessible places rarely reached by the modern world. However, such landscapes
were also presented as stunningly beautiful in their loneliness, and this aspect was regularly
emphasized in World Health. They were used to tempt the reader’s attention to these mys-
terious places (articles commonly began with long descriptions about unusual fauna and flora)
and add a sense of adventure to delivering health in these areas. They were similarly con-
structed with an eye to conveying the ‘right’ message, even when this entailed re-enactment:
when photographing a ‘stranded’ jeep to illustrate the difficulties of communication, a group of
local children rushed to the rescue, believing the jeep to be in genuine difficulty.85 In contrast,
while cities generally benefitted from better access to health services, they were paradoxically
represented as highly dangerous places. Hazards lurked around many corners, in the shape of
traffic accidents and inadequate sanitation, but also in regard to modern living with addiction
to alcohol and drugs, as seen in the example above. Implicit in theWHO’s publications was the
message that, although people were people the world over, they were also specifically located
and subject to the problems associated with different environments.
It is beyond the scope of this article to detail the myriad ways in which location was used,
but it is worth considering some examples to demonstrate that a variety of staging devices were
used to draw readers to certain conclusions. Whether rural or urban, the family home was
presented as being at the heart of human health. It was a setting frequently used to display the
mother and child relationship emphasized by other organizations such as UNICEF. Work-
places, often depicting agricultural or factory work, were shown both as a site of potential
danger from industrial accidents or respiratory disorders and also as an element in the narra-
tive of resolution, whereby returning to work signified productive life recommencing after
83 World Health, September–October 1963.
84 World Health, January–February 1962, pp. 18–23.
85 WHO Newsletter, February 1952.
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Figure 6. Detail from ‘The unknown guardian angels have faces’ photo story, World Health,
September–October 1963, pp. 48–9. Copyright WHO.86
86 Reprinted from World Health, September–October 1963, pp. 48–9. Copyright WHO (1963).
C O M M U N I C A T I N G W O R L D H E A L T H , 1 9 4 8 – 7 0 j1 1 3
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1740022817000304
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of York, on 20 Feb 2018 at 14:57:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
illness had successfully been overcome. The setting of the hospital or the laboratory was used in
diverse ways, and conformed to the wider representation of places where healing and discovery
took place. Finally, the administrative buildings of the WHO were shown as orderly, tranquil,
and purposeful centres where matters were resolved and a healthier future mapped out.
Sometimes the WHO persisted with a particular image which, despite inaccuracies, was
thought to capture the public imagination. This was the case in establishing the idea of a
military operation against malaria. Following Eric Schwab’s 1958 photo story on theMexican
eradication effort, the WHO was subsequently advised that the participation of army per-
sonnel was solely under Ministry of Public Health control, and was asked to avoid any further
confusion.87 However, as Larson’s photographs used some years later demonstrate, the WHO
continued to convey the impression that the Mexican military was involved. Certain photo-
graphs were reused in later issues and other publications, sometimes in connection with topics
they were not originally intended to illustrate, albeit cropped differently or accompanied by
reworked captions. This emphasizes that photography’s value for public information purposes
lay not simply in recording situations realistically and keeping the public informed, but also in
stimulating and directing popular opinion. A good picture was perennially useful, and by the
late 1960s the WHO’s central photo library contained more than 15,000 registered negatives.
The WHO believed it to be the world’s most extensive collection of pictures on the situation of
international health, capable of illustrating health activities and achievements in almost any
area of the world.88 Different influences and specific styles were evident in every photograph,
but the WHO ultimately preferred those which were eye-catching, and which supported a
narrative where ‘scientific accuracy’ was arguably relegated behind ‘attractive and popular’ in
the procurement and selection process. The photographs were required to do much more than
make theWHO’s work visible, and the photographer was less a witness and more a storyteller.
The problems of public information
The WHO periodically evaluated public information work, but success was difficult to
determine explicitly. The circulation of the Newsletter and then World Health grew through-
out the 1950s and 1960s, and the supply of other written and visual material was commonly
exhausted within months of release. These accomplishments were enthusiastically announced
in annual reports, although it was acknowledged that numbers alone did not represent a valid
criterion for assessing the true effectiveness of the work, which was cumulative and dependent
on sustained efforts.89 Nevertheless, the WHO increasingly asked whether public information
expenditure represented good value, and what more could be done to meet its constitutional
obligations. It was probably sensitized to these issues because of early failures and
missed opportunities. Although the PIO was established to inform the greatest number of
people about the agency’s work, it was ironically unable to satisfy the initial levels of interest in
the agency. In 1947 the Interim Commission highlighted the small provision for PIO
87 WHO Archives, Photographic Archives, Sub-fonds Photographers, A, Latin America, Health Services, 1958,
Homer Page, WHO publication ‘Ten steps forward’, letter, 1 October 1958.
88 WHO, Second ten years, pp. 293–4.
89 WHO, The work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to
the United Nations, 1948, Geneva: WHO, 1949, pp. 37–8, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85595
(consulted 20 October 2017).
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staff compared with other UN agencies (two officials compared with twenty-four at the
Food and Agriculture Organization and fifteen at UNESCO), and advised creating two more
permanent posts.90 But subsequent reports noted that not only was the PIO unable to satisfy
demand, but it also had to turn down requests for news items and photographs from popular
science magazines, general health and paramedical publications, yearbooks, encyclopaedias,
and handbooks on international organizations. The annual report for 1950 stressed that
interest in the work of the WHO was ‘almost everywhere greater than are the possibilities of
supplying information about it’.91 Only in 1953 was it possible to fulfil the majority of
requests. This inability to capitalize on early interest also fuelled the conviction that the WHO
could not hope to spread evidence of its existence independently, but needed to rely on other
media outlets to cover the WHO on its behalf.
With the limited resources at its disposal the WHO was similarly unable to provide
translations to meet demand. It therefore depended on local efforts: in 1953 the Regional
Committee for the Western Pacific recommended that each member state take steps: first, to
reproduce and distribute information concerning the work of theWHO ‘on the widest possible
scale’; second, to establish a liaison service; and third, to teach the aims and activities of the
WHO to schoolchildren.92Concluding that public information activities should be intensified,
the Eighth World Health Assembly, the main decision-making body of the WHO, made a
similar request to member governments to ask for cooperation in making the WHO’s work,
limitations, and challenges widely known.93 As new nations joined the UN in the late 1950s
they were approached by the WHO, which emphasized that they should allocate all necessary
resources to help realize the objectives of the agency.
As mentioned above, the WHO hoped to attract external coverage through its magazines,
and later in the 1960s the agency also succeeded in placing its photographs in United Press
International’s EUROPIX service, which served Austria, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Peru, Scandinavia, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab
Republic, and the United States of America.94 These efforts met with some success: a report on
public information projects undertaken between November 1953 and June 1954 recorded that
the popular French magazineElle, and other illustrated periodicals in Switzerland, the UK, and
Germany, had devoted long stories to the WHO. The regional offices worked to inspire
international coverage by arranging for material to be placed in local picture magazines.95 In
1955 it was reported that a ‘popular health magazine’ with a circulation of 300,000 had
reprinted the entire July–August 1954 issue of the Newsletter.96 In 1964 the Oxford
90 WHO Interim Commission, WHO.IC/106, ‘World Health Organization public information’), 1947.
91 WHO,Work of WHO: annual report 1950, p. 69; WHO, The work of WHO: annual report of the Director-
General to the World Health Assembly and to the United Nations, 1949, Geneva: WHO, 1950, p. 76, http://
apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85603 (consulted 20 October 2017).
92 WHO, WP/RC4/R20, ‘Public information – Regional Committee for the Western Pacific 4th session, Tokyo,
3–8 September 1953’.
93 WHO, A8/AFL/26, ‘Public information activities: resolution proposed by the Delegations of Argentina,
Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, Iraq, New Zealand, Sweden and Thailand, World Health Assembly
Agenda Item: 8.4’, 21 May 1955, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/103853/1/WHA8_AFL-26_eng.
pdf (consulted 20 October 2017).
94 WHO, The work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations, 1964, Geneva: WHO, 1965, p. 66, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85775 (consulted
20 October 2017).
95 WHO,MH/D/9.54, Consultative Committee on Public Information, Twentieth session, item 5, 25 June 1954:
‘Report on WHO public information activities during the period November 1953 and June 1954’.
96 WHO, Work of WHO: annual report 1955, p. 53.
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Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) used WHO photographs in its Partners in Progress
exhibition, and a dozenmagazines published the ‘Mask of meningitis’ photograph series which
illustrated a WHO-assisted project on cerebrospinal meningitis control in Niger.97
Life and Life Internationalmagazines used WHO photographs in several stories about the
agency, such as the ten-page article in August 1958 that featured stories on ‘A polio boy on his
feet’, ‘Malaria menace tops all others’, and ‘A world war on disease’.98 Although copyright
freedom meant that there was no need to attribute the accompanying images to the WHO,
most would have been familiar to regular readers of the Newsletter. Coverage of the WHO in
The Rotarian, the official magazine of Rotary International, was more embellished. The article
‘500million children I can’t forget’ emphasized theWHO as a world good, outlining the health
problems facing children globally, and the WHO’s role in solving them. The article featured
Eric Schwab’s photographs of Ede Nwaegbo before and after his treatment for yaws. Ede’s
story was relayed in the following words:
A year or so ago he got yaws … and his face looked like this (left). Even his mother
could barely stand the sight of him. Then a WHO team came along and gave him
a shot of penicillin. Ten days later he looked like this (right). Today, he’s as round,
smooth, and lovable as any 5-year-old. His new lease on life cost the equivalent of
one U.S. Dollar.
The article concluded by proclaiming, ‘this work is monumental and well worth the millions of
dollars that WHO and UNICEF expend’.99 Whether the WHO was pleased with such brazen
positivity, or feared it as more akin to propaganda, is not recorded in the annual reports. But,
like the UN, the WHO probably considered that coverage of its activities in well-regarded and
prestigious outlets helped to enhance its reputation and promote the newsworthy aspects of the
agency.100
Occasionally, however, the use of WHO photographs by external publications caused
controversy. An illustrative case occurred after a 1970 shoot on cancer in Kenya. Somemonths
after Paul Almasy’s photographs were published in World Health, the photo editor, Tibor
Farkas, received a letter from the medical centre involved in the reportage. The director said
that he had been shocked to see his photographs reproduced in the Medical Tribune, because
they presented ‘a confused and completely erroneous picture of our aflatoxin and liver cancer
programme’ which could, he claimed, have political and social repercussions.101 Such was the
WHO’s reputation that inclusion of material credited ‘WHO’ could be taken as tacit endor-
sement even if this was not the intention. In instances like this, however, the WHO had no
control over the editorial decisions of independent publications and could not ask each story to
be sent to the agency to be proofed. Distributing material on a large scale and encouraging
outside publication was a key public information strategy.
In other instances the WHO sternly protected its identity and reputation. This is evident in
the Brando case, and in the efforts to guard against the unauthorized use of the WHO name
97 WHO, Work of WHO: annual report 1964, p. 66.
98 Life International, August 1958, pp. 68–75.
99 Fred Clarke, ‘500 million children I can’t forget’, The Rotarian, May 1958, pp. 49–51.
100 This was not without controversy, however, when the information had been deliberately inserted. See
Alleyne, Global lies?, pp. 68–9.
101 WHO Archives, Photographic Archives, Sub-fonds Photographers, Cancer, Kenya, Almasy, 1972, letter to
Tibor Farkas, 29 June 1973.
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and emblem.102 Its reports might appear outward-looking, but in certain cases the WHO
remained extremely cautious about its global representation. Although the agency would have
agreed with the UN’s broad ideas and goals regarding public information, it was more reticent
regarding the specific ways through which these aims could be achieved. Cinema’s popularity
made it a natural area of interest for the UN, and the film board was envisaged as a body which
would not only make its own newsreels and documentaries but also stimulate outside film
production on the activities of the UN and its agencies.103 Jean Benoit-Levy, head of UN film
activities, and Benjamin Cohen believed that, if studios could be convinced to feature the UN,
this would help to condition audiences to accept the organization as part of their daily lives and
associate it favourably with high purposes. If successful, this would garner millions of dollars’
worth of publicity for the price of one man’s time and wages.104 The former head of the
UNESCO Film Section in Paris, Mogens Skot-Hansen, was selected to supply freelance writers
with story ideas and material, and information on the UN and its agencies.105 But at a meeting
in July 1951, Joseph Handler, the head of the WHO’s PIO, reported that, although
Skot-Hansen had performed an excellent job on behalf of the UN, judgement and sometimes
restraint should still be exercised in approving Hollywood scripts containing UN references.106
This attitude helps explain why the Brando film stalled, despite the fact that it represented
precisely the kind of opportunity that Skot-Hansen had been tasked with securing.
If public information was to have any value and be acknowledged as truthful and
authoritative, the agency needed to safeguard its reputation by preventing the unauthorized
use of its image. A film screened before WHO officials in January 1963 was rejected, owing to
the unsuitable treatment of venereal disease and prostitution. It was decided that the WHO
could not be associated with the film in any way, and that references to the WHO name,
buildings, and activities should be removed. Yet an edited version of the same film was again
deemed unacceptable because it seemed to suggest that the characters were connected with the
WHO, a suggestion reinforced by the fact that the WHO was mentioned in the acknowl-
edgements and commentary. A recall and edit was promised, and the existing footage was
constantly monitored to ascertain whether any illicit copies remained in circulation. The
agency even used its legal office to contact critics who had reviewed the film for newspapers.107
This episode again demonstrates the frequently fine line in the demands placed on public
information officials as they sought to promote their activities but guard against questionable
usage of theWHO’s association. But it also suggests the presence of companies and individuals
that accepted the credibility and authority of the WHO (as stated in the agency’s own public
information materials), but used this connection in ways that could be inappropriate or
controversial.
102 See, for instance, WHO Archives, General Aspects of Film Production, Policy, Distribution, V/6/158/1.
103 Suzanne Langlois, ‘And action! UN and UNESCO coordinating information films, 1945–1951’, in Poul
Duedahl, ed.,A history of UNESCO: global actions and impacts, London: PalgraveMacmillan, 2016, p. 73;
Richard Patterson, ‘The UN in Hollywood: a lesson in public relations’, Hollywood Quarterly, 5, 4, 1951,
p. 327.
104 Patterson, ‘UN in Hollywood’, pp. 328–9.
105 Ian Scott, ‘The glass wall: ideology, Cold War history and post-9/11 Hollywood reflections of the United
Nations’, Journal of Popular Film and Television, 44, 2, 2016, p. 81; Patterson, ‘UN in Hollywood’,
pp. 329–32.
106 United Nations Film Board, 16th session, summary record, 1951 – UNESDOC, p. 3, http://unesdoc.unesco.
org/images/0017/001787/178798eb.pdf (consulted 20 October 2017).
107 WHO Archives, General Aspects of Film Production, Policy, Distribution, V/6/158/1.
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Judging the effect of public information work on the intended audience was harder. The
records do not suggest that a comprehensive answer was ever obtained, although the WHO
had a reasonably good idea of whom it wanted to target and whom it was reaching, recording
the names and addresses of subscribers to its publications. The PIO initially employed a press-
cutting service, covering Switzerland, ‘certain areas of Europe’, and ‘a few non-European
centres’, which delivered some 800 to 1,000 clippings from newspapers and periodicals.108
In 1968 press cuttings received from ‘all parts of the world’ indicated widespread interest in
that year’s World Health Assembly, as well as topics including cancer, cardiovascular
diseases, smallpox eradication, the growing accident rate, family planning, and the shortage of
medical and nursing personnel.109 But the same sources also revealed disappointments,
such as poor press coverage of the 1959 world malaria eradication campaign.110 Internal
reports suggest that the WHO was keen to learn from such failures and renegotiate its appeal:
the ‘constant problem’ of interesting the press in positive health achievements rather
than sensational or controversial topics led the PIO to change the presentation of certain
press releases by including more background information and lively examples. It was
subsequently noted that the strategy resulted in increased interest, although quite how this was
demonstrated is unclear.111 It also remained difficult to estimate the size of the audience
reached by WHO information, and even harder to assess the extent to which public attitudes
were changed.
There are also very few opportunities to assess how the WHO’s photographs were viewed
by the public at large, although a photography competition published inWorld Health of May
1971 provides some telling insights. The front cover featured nineteen photographs with a
banner title encouraging readers to ‘Look carefully at this cover: it may win you a prize’. They
were asked to identify the health activity illustrated in each of the photographs, with bonus
points given for naming the country. The top prizes ranged from a camera, transistor radio,
and wristwatch down to WHO albums, keychains, and subscriptions to World Health. The
competition required close scrutiny of the photographs, as well as a familiarity with the topics
and stylistic conventions in the publication. Although the winners came close, none of the
entrants correctly identified all nineteen photographs. This suggests that, while people were
interested in the photos and found them visually intriguing, they had not taken note of the
particular medical procedures or the geographic location. Since readers were educated to see
emotions and shared problems, photographs were less useful in engaging people as informative
indicators about particular health situations in specific countries.
Conclusions
This article has sought to understand the formulation of the WHO’s public information pro-
grammes and its impact on subsequent visual campaigns. The success of the WHO’s mission
108 WHO, Work of WHO: annual report 1948, pp. 37–8.
109 WHO, Second ten years, pp. 291–2.
110 WHO, The work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations, 1959, Geneva: WHO, 1960, p. 50, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85722 (consulted
20 October 2017).
111 WHO, The work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the
United Nations, 1952, Geneva: WHO, 1953, p. 61, http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85644 (consulted
20 October 2017).
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was thought to depend on its ability to communicate; as a multifaceted international organi-
zation with multiple regional variations and programmes to consider, the new agency aimed to
establish its identity and authority, and to build a rapport with the world public. In doing so, its
communications went beyond keeping the public conversant with the international health
situation and sought to create enthusiasm and interest in the WHO’s activities. As the UN’s
incursions into Hollywood show, this was a key period in working international organizations
into the everyday lives of citizens around the world. However, in an increasingly crowdedmass
media landscape, many organizations competed for public attention.
Control of the WHO’s identity was equally essential, and by the time that the Brando film
proposal was being seriously discussed the organization was increasingly nervous about
relinquishing control over its messages, and about potential damage to its carefully crafted
public image.While the agency competed for attention it did not do so indiscriminately. Health
was of interest to all peoples, but required sensitive treatment if newmeasures were to have any
chance of success. The importance of this can be seen in the complementary drive to monitor
the performance of campaigns and evaluate impact, as well as in the increasing reliance on
media professionals rather than field workers with an amateur interest in the subject.
This article has nevertheless shown how and where the boundaries were pushed. Photo-
graphy was emotional; mission reports and correspondence with photographers demonstrates
that photo stories were the result of a painstaking process and the work of many officials.
Public information was intended to build up a ‘world health-conscious’, but it is unclear
whether those responsible were concerned that their efforts created visual vocabularies which
were stereotyped, or whether there was an awareness of contemporary phenomena akin to
‘compassion fatigue’.112 In evaluating programmes, the WHO’s records are ultimately silent
on these issues, even though the annual reports do record instances where officials were dis-
satisfied by the response to certain campaigns. It is quite possible that some adverse aspects
were not fully recognized until later on, when more serious attempts were made to evaluate
public information work qualitatively. For instance, media enquiries around the delivery of
primary health care revealed how inured people had become to promises of betterment, but the
reader experience is, on the whole, difficult to retrace.
While in the 1950s and 1960s the WHO released material in the hope that it would be
sufficiently attractive to be picked up, it subsequently acknowledged that a vertical approach to
public information was insufficient, and that local communities and journalists needed to be
involved in the process. Information was not necessarily imparted correctly or understood
automatically as a result of press releases.113 The WHO also recognized that communications
technology worked at different pitches around the world, and that a one-size-fits-all approach
was ineffective. New approaches and technologies led to questioning of how to best publicize
the WHO’s work and address criticisms; the popularity of television had, for instance, meant
the decline of many mass-circulation illustrated magazines.114 Image management took on
112 Katherine Hatfield, Ashley Hinck and Marty J. Birkholt, ‘Seeing the visual in argumentation: a rhetorical
analysis of UNICEF Belgium’s Smurf public service announcement’, Argumentation and Advocacy, 43, 3–4,
2007, pp. 144–51; Sadaf Rashid Ali, Debbie James, and Fred Vultee, ‘Strike a pose: comparing associated
press and UNICEF visual representations of the children of Darfur’, African Conflict & Peacebuilding
Review, 3, 1, 2013, pp. 1–26; Fehrenbach and Rodogno, ‘Humanitarian photography’, p. 1132.
113 WHO Archives, Co-ordination with UN and specialized agencies – World Population Year – 1974,
P13/372/11, Jacket 1, CESI/PC.71-17, 27 August 1971, p. 14.
114 Cornell Capa, ed., The concerned photographer 2, London: Thames & Hudson, 1972, p. 1.
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renewed importance in the late 1970s and 1980s, with greater questioning of the WHO’s
authority and capabilities, especially when it experienced financial instability as a result of zero
nominal growth and the failure of some countries to pay their full assessed contributions.115
As a result, public information activities were reduced between 1976 and 1979, with some
elements eliminated altogether: exhibitions would only be issued if funding was found through
extra-budgetary resources. The complete curtailment of the free distribution of photographs
marked a new embattled era of media engagement and crafting of the WHO’s public
persona.116
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